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S.: Divorce--Condonation--Two Acts of Coition Plus Conciliatory Lette
CASE COMMENTS
DIVORCE -

CONDONATION -

Two ACTS OF

COITION PLUS CON-

In her bill of
complaint, a wife charged her husband with cruel and inhuman
treatment under W. VA. CODE, C.48, art. 2, §4 (Michie, 1943). The
husband, in his answer, denied the alleged acts of cruelty and by
way of confession and avoidance set forth the defense of condonation. After a separation as a result of alleged cruelty, the wife by
a letter couched in strongly conciliatory language had expressed an
unequivocal intent to forgive the cruelty, to resume marital relations with the husband, and to return to his abode. On two isolated occasions after the separation, the parties entered into voluntary acts of coition upon the husband's assurance that such action
would not prevent or interfere with the wife obtaining a divorce.
The wife did not return to the husband and there were no intervening acts of cruelty; the parties had no further relationship. The
trial court granted the divorce. Held, one judge dissenting, that
the husband was guilty of statutory cruel and inhuman treatment,
and that the two voluntary actsof sexual intercourse were alone
insufficient to condone the alleged cruelty, but that when considered with the wife's conciliatory letter, both together amounted to
condonation and precluded the granting of the divorce. Decree
reversed. Miles v. Miles, 48 S. E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1948).
CILIATORY LETTER AS CONDONATION FOR CRUELTY. -

In the case of adultery under CODE, c. 48, art. 2, § 14 (Michie,
1943), voluntary cohabitation of the parties after knowledge of the
adultery is a complete bar to the divorce. A single voluntary act
of sexual intercourse between the parties after knowledge constitutes condonation, especially as against the husband. DeBerry v.
DeBerry, 115 W. Va. 604, 177 S. E. 440 (1934). As the court concedes in the instant case, the rule is different where the ground for
divorce is other than adultery, e. g., cruelty. Schletewitz v. Schletewitz, 193 P.2d 34 (Cal. App. 1948); Hanniball v. Hanniball, 18
N. J. Misc. 67, 10 A.2d 492 (1939); Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12
N. J. Misc. 575, 174 At. 469 (1934); Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256,
198 Ad. 154 (1938).
The so-called voluntary acts of coition in the instant case were
accomplished upon the husband's assurance that such conduct
would not hinder the wife's later action for divorce. It is a wellestablished principle that any conduct which is relied on for con-
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donation must be completely voluntary and not induced by fraud,
trick, or artifice. Huffine v. Huffine, 74 N. E.2d 764 (Ohio Com.
P1. 1948). Here the assertions of the husband would seem to
amount to fraud and would thus obviate the acts from being completely voluntary; even if he believed the assertions to be true, they
might serve to estop him from urging the acts as condonation.
In Norman v. Norman, 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407 (1921), the
court held that in a suit for divorce from bed and board grounded
upon cruel and inhuman treatment, the acts relied upon for condonation of such treatment "must evidence unequivocal intent to
forgive the transactions complained of and to voluntarily resume
marital relations." And again in Currence v. Currence, 123 W. Va.
599, 18 S. E.2d 656 (1941), the court held that the resumption of
full marital relations by husband and wife alleged cruel and inhuman treatment operated as a condonation of such offense with
the inference that nothing short of full resumption of martial
relations would suffice.
(Italics supplied.) A mere voluntary
promise to forgive and to return and live with the husband
is not sufficient to constitute condonation by the wife as it it must
be followed by a restoration of the offending party to all marital
rights. Christensen v. Christensen, 125 Me. 897, 134 Atl. 373
(1926); Massie v. Massie, 202 Iowa 1311, 210 N. W. 431 (1926); 2
BisHoP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 36 (5th ed. 1873); see Anderson v.
Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 573, 131 N. W. 907, 908 (1911); Wolff v.
Wolff, 102 Cal. 433, 535, 36 Pac. 767, 768 (1894). The writing of
affectionate letters by the aggrieved spouse" to the guilty one does
not amount to condonation. Lundy v. Lundy, 23 Ariz. 213, 202
Pac. 809 (1922); Forresterv. Forrester, 101 Miss. 155, 57 So. 553
(1912); Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183, 48 Pac. 730 (1897). Condonation is not as strict a bar against a wife as against a husband for the
reason that she often submits through necessity and thus it is more
readily presumed against the husband. Glass v. Glass, 175 Md. 693,
2 A.2d 443 (1938); McLemore v. McLemore, 285 S. W. 693 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926); Dose v. Dose, 198 Ill. App. 387 (1916). It is something more than forgiveness in the sense of ceasing to harbor resentment. It is not only a blotting out of the offense from the mind
and heart of the person forgiving, but the restoration of the offender to his former position. See Rushmore v. Rushmore, supra.
Thus it seems that in order to constitute condonation there
must ordinarily be a continuance or a revival of marital cohabita-
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tion. Elder v. Elder, 139 Va. 19, 123 S. E. 369 (1924); Greco v.
Greco, 121 Ad. 666 (Del. 1923). Contra: Thompson v. Thompson,
49 Nev. 375, 247 Pac.,545 (1926). Whether Norman v. Norman,
supra, so holds is not quite clear from the opinion but such would
seem to be the law, from the inference in Currence v. Currence,
supra. In Myers v. Myers, 127 W. Va. 551, 33 S. E.2d 897 (1945),
an attempt at reconciliation was made consisting of husband and
wife kissing each other and going to bed together after a quarrel.
The court held that such conduct did not amount to a condonation
or reconciliation of differences between the parties as respects the
wife's right to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. From the above authorities it would seem that something
more than a mere intent to forgive and isolated acts of coition
would be necessary to constitute condonation.
It is said that condonation as an affirmative defense is favored
by the law. Brown v. Brown, 51 R. I. 132, 134, 152 Atl. 423 (1930).
But in divorce cases where a determination is made by the trial
court upon the evidence, the findings of the trial chancellor should
be given great weight, Maxwell v. Maxwell, 75 W. Va. 521, 84 S. E.
25 (1915); here, the trial court refused to find condonation. As
was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Kenna in the
instant case, "If condonation is to become the likely result of unsuccessful efforts to become reconciled, it is certain that the person
whos6 rights have been injured will be extremely apprehensive of
the slightest gesture that might result in surrendering a legal right
to relief. It will result in fewer, not more reconciliations." The
authorities and the more nearly analogous cases seem to support the
dissent.

J. F. S., Jr.
EVIDENCE -

ADMISSIBILITY OF INDICTMENTS IN CIVIL CASES IN

FEDERAL COuRT.-A and B were jointly sued for the conversion of

money. They introduced evidence of their general good character.
They objected to the introduction of testimony by the plaintiff that
they had had been jointly indicted for an earlier crime, receiving
stolen property, in 1931 and 1933. On both occasions A pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. No further proceedings, beyond the indictment, were taken against B as to the 1931 indictment; but he
pleaded guilty to the 1933 indictment and later was permitted to
withdraw his plea and the case as to him was dropped. The trial
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